

# Evaluating youth employment policies with administrative data: methodological and practical challenges

**JUDIT KREKÓ** 

Youth employment partnerSHIP: evaluation studies in Spain, Hungary, Italy and Poland

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# Background: Youth employment partnerSHIP

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#### Research project in international cooperation:

- > Evaluation studies in Spain, Hungary, Italy and Poland
- Counterfactual impact evalution of active labour market policy programmes
- Motivation: high share of young persons, who are Not in Education, Employment or Training (NEETs)

Research outputs: <a href="http://yepartnership.ibs.org.pl/publications">http://yepartnership.ibs.org.pl/publications</a>

#### Hungarian evaluation:

> Can a short-term job trial programme kick-start young jobseekers' career?

http://yepartnership.ibs.org.pl/p/can-a-short-term-job-trial-programme-kick-start-young-jobseekers-career

Counterfactual evaluation of youth employment policies - Methodological guide

http://yepartnership.ibs.org.pl/content/uploads/2021/02/Methodological-guide.pdf

# COUNTERFACTUAL EVALUATION OF YOUTH EMPLOYMENT POLICIES - METHODOLOGICAL GUIDE

Tips and experiences from the evaluation of labor market programs aiming at young people in Poland, Spain, Italy and Hungary

#### Main issues covered:

Use of and access to administrative data

#### > The process of the evaluation:

- > How to choose a specific programme to evaluate?
- Choice of the outcome variable
  - What are the goals of the programme?
- Choice of the counterfactual evaluation method
- > Heterogenous effects

#### Presentation and interpretation of the results for policymakers

Conclusions for design and implementation, external validity, deadweight losses, cost efficiency



"My question is: Are we making an impact?"


# THE USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

The beauty of administrative data:

- High or full coverage, large sample sizes
- Usually high reliability and completeness
- Bias from self-reporting is less of an issue
- Potential of link different databases

#### Administrative data sources for labour market analysis:

- > Social security (Pension, health autorities)
- Public employment services (PES)
- Unemployment registries
- > Tax authority database (Personal oand corporate income)
- Emloyer databases




## MAIN CHALLENGES WITH ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

#### Main challenges:

- Legal or practical obstacles to accessing and linking datasets
  - Is there a formal procedure for obtaining access to admin data or is it discretionary?
  - Data protection considerations vs bureaucratic barriers
- Does a country level database exist?
- Can we identify the programme participants, or only the eligible group?
- Does the database contain the necessary variables?
  - Pool of background variables might be limited (family status, education)
  - Labour programme participants are often not followed up: hard to get outcome variables

Linking different administrative databases might be a solution

(e.g. PES with social security, linked employer-employee databases)



strategy

# COUNTERFACTUAL IMPACT EVALUATION

Main problem: the counterfactual world is not observed

The evaluatior has to infer from actual data


But: non-participants might differ from participants in observed and unobserved characteristics

 $\downarrow$ 

#### Selection bias:

- > Baseline difference: the outcome of the two groups are different even without the policy
- > Heterogeus policy effect: the policy affects participants and non-participants differently

# HOW TO CHOOSE AN IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY?



# AN APPLICATION: COUNTERFACTUAL EVALUATION OF THE 90-DAY JOB TRIAL PROGRAMME IN HUNGARY

## 90-day job trial

- > One of the various programmes within Youth Guarantee of EU, introduced in 2015
- Short term wage subsidy, up to 100% of total labour costs
- Subsidized period: 90 days, no obligation of further employment →cheap, but might kick-start employment by a good introduction

### Main questions:

Q1 Who are selected into the program from the pool of registered jobseekers?

• Principle of Youth Guarantee: priority to long-term unemployed, vulnerable and socially excluded groups

Q2 What is the effect of participation in the job trial program on

- Work: probability of being employed 6 months after the program and cumulative days within 6 months after completing the programme
- Wages: cumulative wages within 6 months after completing the program

# **IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY**

**Identification** is a challenge:

- > Hard to find exogenous variation and a good control group
- > Hard to separate the job trial from other Youth Guarantee programmes (same eligibility rules, same time)

Propensity score matching program participants using two control groups


- 1. Participants of public works program (and have not participated in YG)
- 2. Participants of training programs

How can we remove the selection bias?

# PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING

Basic idea: compare programme participants with similar non-participants

Similar: has the same chance toparticipate in the programme(has similar propensity score)



# DATA, OUTCOME AND CONTROL VARIABLES

Data: Admin3

> a large database consists of linked datasets of administrative authorities:

tax, social secutiry, health, public employment service, educational authority

- ➤ Individual level, random 50% sample of the population
- > Data on program details, employment, wages, benefits from 2003
- Created and owned by the Databank of the Centre of Regional and Economic Studies



Rich set of:


- **Control variables**: full labour market history, education background, health status, benefits and transfers, competence test scores, type of settlement, distance to public employment service etc.
- Outcome variables: employment status and wage income after completion of the programme

# SELECTION INTO THE TREATMENT GROUP: CREAM SKIMMING

- ➤ Job trial (and YG) participants are the most employable registered jobseekers
  - More educated
  - ➤ Longer employment history, shorter NEET history
  - Shorter maternity history
  - > Lower prob. to live in small villages
  - Lower prob. to search elementary jobs
- ➤ Contradicts principle of Youth Guarantee:

  priority should be given to most vulnerable groups

  and long term unemployed



# SOME OTHER RESULTS

- ➤ Participation in job trial increases the probability of working 6 months after the programme compared to public works participants significantly by 6-8% points
- > Selection accounts for more than half of the raw mean difference in the probability of being employed between the treatment group and public works participants

> But no significant difference compared to training participants

- > Higher educated programme participants have better outcomes 6 months after the programme, but compared to the control group, the **impact** is similar on participants with basic education
  - →Higher priority should be given to disadvantaged youth

➤ Gender dimension: mothers are less likely to participate, the participant women are even more selected than males and the policy effect is weaker → Policy should foster participation of young mothers



# Thank you for your attention!

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